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Essays on Optimal Insurance Design
Johannes Spinnewijn
This dissertation consists of three chapters that analyze 
the optimal design of insurance contracts and unemployment 
insurance in particular. I consider three relevant contexts that 
change the central trade-off between the provision of insur-
ance and the provision of incentives.
The fi rst chapter examines the role of biased beliefs for 
the optimal design of static and dynamic insurance contracts. 
Biased risk perceptions change the perceived value of insur-
ance and the perceived returns to avoiding these risks. I show 
empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how 
quickly they will fi nd work, but underestimate the return to 
their search efforts. I analyze how these biases drive a wedge 
between social and private insurance, and between naive and 
optimal policy implementation.
The second chapter considers the role of training for 
the design of unemployment insurance. A worker’s hu-
man capital falls upon displacement and depreciates during 
unemployment. Training counters the decrease in human 
capital, but also changes the willingness of the unemployed 
to search. I characterize the optimal unemployment insurance 
contract and analyze the optimal timing of unemployment 
benefi ts and training programs during unemployment.
The third chapter analyzes the role of heterogeneity in 
risk perceptions for the optimal design of screening contracts 
in a model with moral hazard and adverse selection. I show 
how optimists receive less insurance than pessimists, and 
I contrast the distortions in insurance coverage that arise 
with competing and monopolistic insurers. Heterogeneity in 
beliefs strengthens the case for government intervention in 
insurance markets and can explain the negative correlation 
between risk occurrence and insurance coverage found in 
empirical studies.  
Introduction
People face risks and dislike the variation in income 
due to these risks. They are willing to give up consumption 
in good times to increase their consumption in bad times. 
Whether times are good or bad often depends on their own 
behavior. People can mitigate the risk or reduce the prob-
ability that a loss occurs by exerting precautionary effort. 
Moral hazard arises when insured people do not account for 
the consequences of their behavior on the expected expendi-
tures for the insurer. The insured will exert less precaution-
ary efforts the more insured they are. Insurers thus face a 
fundamental trade-off between providing insurance against 
risks and providing incentives to avoid risks. This trade-off is 
central to the design of optimal insurance contracts.
  The trade-off between insurance and incentives also 
arises for the design of social insurance contracts, like un-
employment insurance. Workers may lose their jobs beyond 
their control. They are willing to pay a tax when employed in 
order to receive unemployment benefi ts when they lose their 
jobs. Unemployed workers do not fully control how rapidly 
they are employed again, but by exerting search efforts they 
can increase the probability to fi nd a job. Unemployment 
insurance insures the unemployed against the loss of their 
labor earnings, but also reduces the incentives to search for 
a job.
Chapter 1
Unemployed but Optimistic: Optimal Insurance 
Design with Biased Beliefs
Insurers face the trade-off between providing insur-
ance against risks and incentives to avoid risks. The risk 
perceptions of the insured are central to this trade-off. The 
perceived likelihood of risks determines the perceived value 
of insurance against these risks. The perceived return to pre-
cautionary effort determines the effectiveness of incentives 
to avoid risks. Both types of perceptions are often subject 
to systematic biases. Psychological research has shown 
that people often overestimate the probability of positive 
events and underestimate the probability of negative events 
(Slovic 2000; Weinstein 1980, 1982, 1984) and can either be 
optimistic (Langer 1975) or discouraged (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, 
and Zeisel 1971) about the degree to which they control 
outcomes. These particular biases complement the heuristics 
and biases in probabilistic thinking documented by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974).
The central contribution of this chapter is the theoretical 
and empirical analysis of unemployment insurance and the 
biases in beliefs held by the unemployed. On the theoretical 
side, I analyze how biased beliefs change the optimal design 
of static and dynamic insurance contracts in the presence of 
moral hazard. The distinction between the baseline belief 
about the probability of fi nding work and the control belief 
about the extent to which search efforts increase this prob-
ability is shown to be essential. The theoretical results gener-
alize to insurance applications with moral hazard, other than 
unemployment insurance. On the empirical side, I present 
new evidence that suggests that job seekers are highly opti-
mistic about the probability of fi nding a job, but pessimistic 
about their control.
Using data collected by Price et al. (2004), I link the 
expectations of unemployed job seekers with the actual out-
comes of their job searches. The fi rst empirical result is that 
job seekers largely underestimate the duration of their unem-
ployment spells; on average they expect to remain unem-
ployed for 7 weeks, but actually need 23 weeks to fi nd new 
2 2009 Dissertation Summaries
employment. Many more job seekers have underestimated 
rather than overestimated the length of their unemployment 
spells, and the forecast errors are much more pronounced for 
the optimistic than for the pessimistic job seekers, as present-
ed in Figure 1. The second empirical result is that job seekers 
who report searching more intensively are less optimistic 
about the length of their unemployment spells. Controlling 
for heterogeneity and endogeneity, I provide evidence that 
job seekers underestimate the returns to their search efforts. 
Job seekers who search harder expect shorter unemployment 
spells, but the actual reduction in the unemployment spell is 
larger than expected. This suggests that job seekers are at the 
same time baseline-optimistic and control-pessimistic; they 
overestimate the baseline probability of fi nding work, but 
underestimate their control over this probability.
The theoretical analysis builds on a canonical result 
for social insurance known as the Baily formula. Optimal 
insurance equalizes the benefi t of smoothing consumption 
between states and the moral hazard cost at the margin. Baily 
(1978) formalized this principle for unemployment insurance 
in a static model with moral hazard. For unemployment in-
surance to be optimal, the relative difference in marginal util-
ities of consumption in employment and unemployment has 
to be equal to the elasticity of the unemployment duration 
to the unemployment benefi t level. I show how this charac-
terization needs to be adjusted when the insured have biased 
beliefs. I assume that the insurer knows the insured’s beliefs 
and that these beliefs cannot be manipulated by the insurer, 
nor changed in response to the contract being offered. These 
assumptions correspond to a setting with different priors 
where the insurer and the insured “agree to disagree.”
I contrast the contracts offered by two extreme types of 
insurers: a social planner, who is paternalistic and maximizes 
the insured agent’s true expected utility, and competing 
private insurers, who maximize the insured agent’s perceived 
expected utility. When beliefs are unbiased, the probability 
weights in the respective expected utility functions are the 
same. The social optimum and the competitive equilibrium 
coincide. Moral hazard, in contrast with adverse selection, 
is no reason for government intervention as long as beliefs 
are unbiased. When beliefs are biased, the social optimum 
and the competitive equilibrium diverge. The implied wedge 
suggests a previously unexplored welfare cost of privatizing 
insurance.
In the social optimum the smoothing benefi t and the moral 
hazard cost are still equalized at the margin, but with the 
moral hazard cost corrected for the search internality that 
arises when the insured agent misperceives the impact of her 
search on her own true expected utility. An increase in insur-
ance coverage decreases the induced effort level, but when an 
agent is pessimistic about her control, she already exerts too 
little effort. Thus, with control-pessimistic insurees, the moral 
hazard cost of insurance needs to be revised upward because 
of the search internality. The elasticity of the unemploy-
ment duration to unemployment benefi ts no longer provides 
suffi cient information to implement the optimal insurance 
contract. A naive policymaker, who ignores the pessimistic 
control bias and implements the standard Baily formula, sets 
the unemployment benefi t level suboptimally high.
Private insurers do not correct for the search internal-
ity and focus on the insured’s perceived value of insurance. 
In the competitive equilibrium, the moral hazard cost of 
additional insurance is set equal to the perceived smooth-
ing benefi t. When an agent is optimistic about the baseline 
probability of fi nding work, she underestimates the value of 
unemployment insurance. Private insurers respond to this 
bias by offering less or even no insurance at all. This may 
explain the puzzle of why unemployment insurance is almost 
always publicly provided.1 Competition disciplines insurers 
to charge actuarially fair prices, but not to correct people’s 
distorted demand for insurance.
I proceed to consider a dynamic extension of the unem-
ployment model along the lines of Hopenhayn and Nico-
lini (1997). The conventional wisdom in economic policy 
debates is that unemployment benefi ts should be decreas-
ing with the length of the unemployment spell. The threat 
of falling benefi ts in the future increases the incentives for 
unemployed workers to search for work (Shavell and Weiss 
1979). First, I show, using Baily-type conditions, that the 
adjustment of the optimal dynamic characterization for the 
presence of biases in beliefs is very similar, as in the static 
model; the social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for 
the search internality, while the private insurers focus on the 
perceived smoothing benefi ts. Second, when unemployed 
agents underestimate the duration of unemployment, the 
social planner may increase welfare by providing more in-
centives to the short-term unemployed than to the long-term 
unemployed. Optimism about the duration of unemployment 
makes the threat of receiving lower unemployment benefi ts 
in the future less effective in inducing search efforts. I show 
Figure 1  Histogram of Differences between Actual and 
Expected Unemployment Duration
SOURCE: Unemployed job seekers in Maryland and Detroit 
between 1996 and 1998 surveyed by Price et al. (2004).
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that in contrast with private insurers, the social planner may 
prefer to make unemployment benefi ts more rapidly decreas-
ing at the start of the unemployment spell and more slowly 
later on.
I calibrate the dynamic model in order to numerically 
analyze the impact of biased beliefs on the optimal design 
of unemployment insurance. The calibration exercise also 
shows that the consumption subsidy required to make the 
agent insured by private insurers as well off as in the social 
optimum, increases exponentially in the baseline bias. Al-
though the risk of an unemployment spell seems small within 
a lifetime, privatizing the insurance provision comes at a 
very high welfare cost if beliefs are strongly biased.
Related Literature
The empirical and experimental evidence on the misper-
ceptions of probabilities has led to two recent strands of 
literature. One strand proposes explanations for biases in 
beliefs and shows how these biases can be sustained in 
equilibrium. Examples are Bénabou and Tirole (2002 and 
2006), Compte and Postlewaite (2004), Glaeser (2004), Van 
den Steen (2004), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Gollier 
(2005), and Köszegi (2006). These theoretical papers sug-
gest that optimistic beliefs, either about the baseline prob-
ability of success or one’s control, are more likely to arise 
and persist than pessimistic beliefs. This corresponds to the 
empirical evidence that I fi nd for the unemployed’s baseline 
beliefs, but contrasts with the empirical evidence for the 
unemployed’s control beliefs.
The theoretical analysis in this chapter is related to the 
second strand of literature that takes biases in risk percep-
tions as given and analyzes the consequences for contract 
design in the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection. 
de la Rosa (2007) and Santos-Pinto (2008) analyze how in-
centive contracts proposed by a profi t-maximizing principal 
change in response to particular optimistic biases. The re-
sponse depends on the extent to which the considered biases 
make the agent more baseline-optimistic or control-optimis-
tic as defi ned here. Also, changes in control beliefs change 
the price of providing incentives relative to insurance. The 
effect of changing control beliefs on the induced effort level 
is unambiguous; the effect on the insurance provision is 
not. The main focus of this chapter is on the unambiguous 
comparison, for a given bias in beliefs, between social and 
private insurance on the one hand and optimal and naive 
implementation on the other. Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004) 
and Villeneuve (2005) study the effects of exogenous biased 
beliefs in models with adverse selection due to heterogeneity 
in risk. Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), Grubb (forthcoming), and 
Sandroni and Squintani (2007) study adverse selection due to 
heterogeneity in risk perceptions. In Chapter 3, I also allow 
for heterogeneity in risk perceptions by relaxing the assump-
tion made in this chapter that the agent’s prior is known to 
the principal. I then analyze how agents are screened with 
contracts providing different levels of insurance coverage 
depending on the difference in baseline and control beliefs.
The comparison between social and private insurance 
relates to the policy and welfare analysis in the behavioral 
public economics literature, studying nonstandard decision 
makers.2 The use of the true probabilities to evaluate welfare 
is paternalistic, but highlights the contrast with the consid-
erations of profi t-maximizing insurers. The comparison also 
relates to the distinction between a paternalistic and populist 
government, with the latter catering to its voters’ beliefs 
(Salanié and Treich 2009). The use of the true probabilities 
also assumes that these are measurable. Bernheim and Ran-
gel (2009) argue that the presence of ancillary conditions, 
like framing issues, may distort people’s choices. To the 
extent that better informing individuals alleviates ancillary 
conditions, the perceived probabilities after individuals are 
informed are more appropriate for evaluating their welfare 
than the perceived probabilities before they are informed. 
The empirical estimation of the biases in beliefs in this chap-
ter can help to identify agents’ true preferences from their 
observed choices, as argued by Köszegi and Rabin (2007 and 
2008). Finally, the comparison between the implementation 
of the standard and adjusted Baily formula adds to the recent 
literature reviewed by Chetty (2009) that analyzes conditions 
under which suffi cient statistic formulas for taxation and 
social insurance apply or need to be adjusted.
Chapter 2
Training and Search during Unemployment
Optimal unemployment insurance trades off the provision 
of incentives to search for work and the insurance against the 
consequences of unemployment. The obvious consequence 
of unemployment is the foregone wage while unemployed. 
However, after returning to work, many still have substan-
tially lower wages than before displacement. In the United 
States, one fourth of the reemployed have wages that were 
at least 25 percent lower than in their previous jobs (Kling 
2006). It has been argued that these future income losses 
for the unemployed are due to the loss of human capital. 
Displaced workers lose human capital the moment they lose 
their jobs, and their human capital continues to depreciate 
during unemployment. Unemployment insurance should 
therefore insure the unemployed against both the loss of 
current earnings and the expected loss of future earnings. At 
the same time, incentives for search are more important for 
a given level of human capital if fi nding a job avoids further 
depreciation of human capital.
Effective training programs counter the loss of human 
capital. Many countries are increasing the emphasis on train-
ing to reintegrate the unemployed in the workforce. Spend-
ing on labor market programs, active and passive, averages 
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3 percent of GDP in the OECD countries. The proportion 
of spending on active labor market programs rather than on 
unemployment benefi ts has increased to 40–50 percent in 
most European countries, of which on average 40 percent is 
spent on training. The impact of training programs has been 
estimated in the empirical literature. An important conclusion 
of this literature is the heterogeneity in impact of the differ-
ent programs (Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999). More 
recent work supports the positive long-run effect of training 
programs with a substantial human capital component (Ja-
cobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2005; Jespersen, Munch, and 
Skipper 2004; Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 2005; Winter-
Ebmer 2006).
This chapter analyzes the role of training for the design of 
unemployment insurance. I characterize the optimal unem-
ployment insurance contract, specifying both consumption 
and training contingent on the duration of the unemployment 
spell. I consider a model in which a worker’s human capital 
decreases during unemployment, but training efforts counter 
this decrease.3 The training efforts are imposed by the social 
planner, while the search efforts to fi nd a job are chosen 
by the unemployed worker. The unemployed worker bears 
the cost of both the search and training efforts, which are 
allowed to interact, as in Holmström and Milgrom (1991). 
More training may increase the marginal cost of search. I 
assume that the same training technology is not available on 
the job. One justifi cation is that employers are not willing to 
provide training that is not specifi c to their fi rms.
  If the training technology is suffi ciently effective, the 
unemployed worker is in one of three states depending on the 
level of human capital:
 1)  In the training state, the level of human capital is so low 
that no search is induced. Training efforts are imposed 
to increase the level of human capital. Since no incen-
tives are needed, the social planner can fully smooth the 
unemployed’s consumption.
 2)  In the training-and-search state, human capital is suffi -
ciently high so that search efforts are induced. The social 
planner faces the trade-off between providing insur-
ance and incentives. The depreciation of human capital 
increases both the value of insurance and the need for 
incentives. By mitigating the depreciation, training ef-
forts relax the trade-off. The design of the optimal con-
tract for an unemployed agent in the training-and-search 
state will be dependent on the complementarity between 
search and training in the expected value of fi nding a job 
and the rivalry in the cost structure.
 3)  In a stationary state, the social planner makes the un-
employed maintain the same level of human capital by 
following training programs. At the same time they are 
given incentives to search for a job.
I characterize analytically how consumption during un-
employment and upon re-employment depends on the length 
of the unemployment spell. As long as search is induced, the 
introduction of training does not change the result by Shavell 
and Weiss (1979) that unemployment consumption should 
be decreasing over time when preferences are additive in 
consumption and search efforts. However, in the training 
state, no search is induced and unemployment consumption 
remains constant. The intuition of Hopenhayn and Nicolini 
(1997) that taxes upon reemployment should increase with 
the duration of the unemployment spell does not general-
ize with the introduction of human capital depreciation and 
training. The social planner wants to protect the unemployed 
against human capital losses and may prefer to subsidize 
employment, even after long unemployment spells.
I perform numerical simulations for CARA preferences 
with monetary costs of efforts. I show that for such prefer-
ences the state space of the recursive problem becomes 
one-dimensional. The numerical simulations suggest that 
the human capital of the long-term unemployed converges 
globally to a unique stationary level. This has two important 
policy implications. First, if training costs are not too high, 
it is never optimal to discourage the unemployed worker 
from search activity, whatever the length of the unemploy-
ment spell. This contrasts with Pavoni (2009) and Pavoni 
and Violante (2007). Without training technology, they show 
that after a fi nite number of unsuccessful searches, the social 
planner switches to social assistance, an absorbent policy 
characterized by constant unemployment benefi ts and no 
active participation. Second, the difference between this 
unique, stationary level and the level of human capital at the 
start of the unemployment spell determines the optimal tim-
ing of training. If the initial level of human capital is lower, 
training is more intensive toward the start of unemploy-
ment. If the initial level of human capital is higher, training 
becomes more intensive throughout unemployment.
The human capital level at the start and the stationary 
level are determined, respectively, by the fall in human 
capital upon displacement and the depreciation in human 
capital during unemployment. Although in practice training 
is more focused toward the long-term unemployed, this is 
only optimal if the depreciation in human capital is rela-
tively more important than the fall upon displacement. Upon 
displacement, the unemployed may lose fi rm-specifi c human 
capital. They also lose human capital specifi c to the industry 
if they are reemployed in a different industry (Ljungqvist and 
Sargent 1998; Neal 1995). These losses may become very 
important in an economy with declining industries or indus-
tries shifting production abroad. The depreciation during 
unemployment can be interpreted as the explicit loss of skills 
during unemployment or as a process of “unlearning by not 
doing” (Coles and Masters 2000). If unemployment spells 
persist for a long time, unemployed workers can get detached 
from the labor market and lose work habits and confi dence in 
the own skills (Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2006b). Although 
the empirical evidence for the decline and depreciation of 
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human capital is mixed, both have been central in explain-
ing the persistence of unemployment and the European 
unemployment dilemma (Ljungqvist and Sargent 1998; 
Machin and Manning 1999; Pissarides 1992), as well as the 
negative duration dependence of exit rates (Acemoglu 1995; 
Blanchard and Diamond 1994).
This chapter builds on a recent literature that departs from 
stationary search models (Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997; 
Shavell and Weiss 1979) with the introduction of depreci-
ating human capital. Shimer and Werning (2006) analyze 
the optimal timing of benefi ts in a McCall search model, 
assuming that savings are not observable. Human capital 
depreciation reduces the arrival rate of job offers or dete-
riorates the distribution of the wages being paid on the job. 
Pavoni (2009) analyzes the optimal unemployment insurance 
contract when the unemployed agent has the binary choice to 
exert costly search effort or not. The depreciation of human 
capital reduces the output upon reemployment and the prob-
ability to become employed if searching. In this chapter, I 
assume that human capital only determines the output. Since 
search is a continuous choice in my model, the decrease in 
output due to the depreciation reduces the returns to search. 
The probability to become employed endogenously decreas-
es during the unemployment spell if no training technology 
is available. Pavoni and Violante (2007) introduce costly job 
monitoring as an alternative to the provision of incentives 
and analyze the optimal sequencing of different unemploy-
ment policies. Pavoni and Violante (2007) and Wunsch 
(2008) also introduce a training technology in the numeri-
cal simulations of the model in Pavoni and Violante (2007). 
In contrast with my approach, training efforts cannot be 
imposed, but they are induced by rewarding the unemployed 
for high values of human capital with higher unemployment 
benefi ts. Training and search efforts are also assumed to be 
extreme rivals and cannot both be exerted in the same period.
Chapter 3
Insurance and Perceptions: How to Screen 
Optimists and Pessimists
The perception of risk is inherently subjective.4 Financial 
traders disagree about the risk of investments, mortgage 
bankers about the risk of defaulting homeowners, homeown-
ers and renters about the risk of fl ooding, old and young 
drivers about the risk of a car accident. One person may 
perceive a risk as very likely, while another may perceive 
the same risk as unlikely. At the same time, the perception 
of the extent to which precautionary efforts mitigate the risk 
may differ as well. Both the perception of the likelihood of 
the risk and the perception of control are central to the design 
of insurance contracts. Baseline-pessimistic insurees, who 
underestimate the baseline likelihood of the risk, are willing 
to pay more for insurance. Control-optimistic insurees, who 
overestimate the marginal return to effort, exert more precau-
tionary efforts and are therefore cheaper to insure.
This chapter analyzes the role of heterogeneity in risk 
perceptions for the optimal design of screening contracts. 
In a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, I show 
how incentive compatibility imposes a very simple structure 
on the equilibrium contracts and I contrast the distortions in 
insurance coverage that arise with competing and monopo-
listic insurers. On the positive side, heterogeneity in risk 
perceptions offers an alternative explanation for the negative 
correlation between risk occurrence and insurance cover-
age found in empirical studies. On the normative side, the 
presence of agents with biased beliefs improves or worsens 
the welfare of agents with unbiased beliefs depending on the 
market structure and the differences in beliefs.
I consider a simple model with two states. Effort exerted 
by the insuree decreases the probability that a risk occurs, 
but insurees can have different perceptions about the prob-
ability of the risk as a function of effort. The insurer cannot 
observe the belief held by the insuree, but perceives her risk 
as independent of her belief. The insuree does not change 
her belief in response to the menu of insurance contracts 
being offered. That is, the insurer and the insurees “agree 
to disagree” about the true underlying risk. The preferences 
satisfy a single-crossing property if the one insuree perceives 
the likelihood of the risk as lower than the other insuree 
for any given insurance contract. This is conditional on the 
effort levels chosen by the respective insurees. Optimism 
can therefore arise for two reasons; fi rst of all, if an insuree 
is more optimistic about the baseline likelihood of the risk 
for the same level of effort and, second, if an insuree is more 
optimistic about the marginal return of effort and therefore 
exerts higher effort for the same insurance contract. If the 
single-crossing property is satisfi ed, the insurer can only 
separate the (more) optimistic insuree by offering her less 
insurance coverage than the (more) pessimistic insuree. This 
monotonicity property is independent of the nature of com-
petition between insurers.
Optimistic agents receive less insurance, but still may be 
more risky ex-post if they are pessimistic about their control 
and exert less precautionary effort. This contrasts with the 
property of positive correlation between insurance coverage 
and risk occurrence that arises in the standard adverse selec-
tion framework (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). However, 
many empirical papers fi nd a correlation that is not signifi -
cantly positive (Cardon and Hendel 2001; Chiappori and 
Salanié 1997, 2000) or even negative (Cawley and Philipson 
1999; De Meza and Webb 2001; Finkelstein and McGarry 
2006). With two types of insurees who only differ in their 
beliefs, I show that it is suffi cient that the one type is more 
baseline-optimistic and control-optimistic for the equilibrium 
to satisfy the positive correlation property. For the correla-
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tion to be negative, it is necessary that the control-pessimistic 
type is also more optimistic about the likelihood of the risk.
A prime issue for characterizing optimal contracts with 
private information is determining which incentive compat-
ibility constraints are binding and thus which types’ contracts 
are distorted compared to the case without private informa-
tion. I show how this depends on the interaction between the 
nature of competition and the dimension in which beliefs are 
biased. Competing insurers distort the contract offered to the 
insuree who can be insured at lower cost, which depends on 
the exerted precautionary effort and thus the insuree’s control 
beliefs. A monopolistic insurer distorts the contract offered to 
the insuree whose willingness to pay is lower, which depends 
on the insuree’s baseline beliefs. Compared to someone who 
is unbiased, an optimist’s willingness to pay is lower for an 
insurance contract providing more insurance than her outside 
option, but higher for an incentive contract providing less 
insurance than her outside option.
The distortions due to the screening of types imply that 
agents with heterogeneous perceptions impose information 
externalities on each other. An agent with biased beliefs 
imposes a negative externality on an agent with unbiased be-
liefs, when private insurers distort the unbiased agent’s con-
tract to discourage the biased agent from taking this contract. 
The externality is only positive when a monopolistic insurer 
pays a rent to the unbiased agent not to take the contract 
offered to the biased type. For agents with biased beliefs, 
the screening distortions may aggravate the distortion due to 
the biases in their beliefs, as analyzed in Chapter 1. Hence, 
heterogeneity in optimistic beliefs may strengthen the case 
for (paternalistic) government intervention through mandat-
ing insurance. This contrasts with the result in Sandroni 
and Squintani (2007) that heterogeneity in beliefs reduces 
the scope for government intervention. The heterogeneity 
in optimistic beliefs they consider implies that some agents 
with different risks perceive their risk to be the same and are 
pooled in equilibrium. The heterogeneity I consider implies 
that agents with the same underlying risk are separated.
Related Literature
This chapter studies the role of biased beliefs in the pres-
ence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. In Chapter 
1, I consider only moral hazard, assuming that the bias in 
beliefs is known to the insurer. Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004), 
Chassagnon and Villeneuve (2005), and Villeneuve (2005) 
consider only adverse selection. They introduce heterogene-
ity in risk types, but risk types may misperceive their risk. 
Sandroni and Squintani (2007) also introduce heterogeneity 
in risk types, but some agents of the high-risk type may be 
optimistic about being a low-risk type.
A small theoretical literature has suggested explanations 
for the advantageous selection with heterogeneous types that 
leads to negative correlation between risk occurrence and in-
surance coverage. Koufopoulos (2008) and Huang, Liu, and 
Tzeng (2007) assume the presence of one type who exerts 
no precautionary effort, but is still more optimistic about the 
likelihood of the risk than the other type who exerts precau-
tionary effort. This chapter generalizes this intuition driven 
by heterogeneity in perceptions and characterizes how the 
correlation between risk occurrence and insurance cover-
age depends on the correlation between baseline and control 
beliefs. De Meza and Webb (2001) and Jullien, Salanié, 
and Salanié (2007) explain the presence of advantageous 
selection by heterogeneity in risk preferences. Chiappori 
et al. (2006) show that such heterogeneity is not suffi cient 
to explain the negative correlation if the competition in the 
insurance market is perfect. The correlation results in this 
chapter are independent of the nature of competition.
This chapter also relates to the literature that explores how 
fi rms exploit the bounded rationality of consumers, surveyed 
in Ellison (2006). In particular, Grubb (forthcoming) and 
Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) analyze how fi rms exploit differ-
ences in overconfi dence and optimism about future demand 
respectively with a menu of screening contracts. I also con-
sider the externalities that biased agents and unbiased agents 
impose on each other. In a similar spirit, DellaVigna and 
Malmendier (2004) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) analyze 
how sophisticated and nonsophisticated types affect each 
others’ welfare.
Notes
I would like to thank my advisors, Bengt Holmstrom, Ivan Werning, 
Jonathan Gruber, and Peter Diamond, for their support and valuable 
discussions and suggestions.
 1. Exceptions are unemployment insurance provided by trade 
unions or voluntary public unemployment insurance systems 
in countries like Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, grown 
out of trade union programs (Parsons, Tranaes, and Lilleor 
2003). The latter are heavily subsidized by the government, as 
expected with baseline-optimistic insurees. The existence of 
private information and aggregate risk and the government’s 
advantage in coping with moral hazard have been suggested as 
explanations for the absence of private unemployment insur-
ance (Barr 2001; Chiu and Karni 1998). Acemoglu and Shimer 
(2000) conclude, “Why unemployment insurance is almost 
always publicly provided, in contrast to most other insurance 
contracts, remains an important, unresolved question.”
 2. For reviews, see Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and Kanbur, 
Pirttila, and Tuomala (2004). 
 3. I ignore the use of training programs to screen and target un-
employment benefi ts (Akerlof 1978; Besley and Coate 1992)
 4. Slovic (2000) surveys the research documenting the heteroge-
neity in the perception of risk and its determinants.
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